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Abstract
Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases pose growing global public health threats. However, 
research on and development of medical countermeasures (MCMs) for such pathogens is limited 
by the sporadic and unpredictable nature of outbreaks, lack of financial incentive for 
pharmaceutical companies to develop interventions for many of the diseases, lack of clinical 
research capacity in areas where these diseases are endemic, and the ethical dilemmas related to 
conducting scientific research in humanitarian emergencies. Hence, clinicians providing care for 
patients with emerging diseases are often faced with making clinical decisions about the safety and 
effectiveness of experimental MCMs, based on limited or no human safety, preclinical, or even 
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earlier product research or historical data, for compassionate use. Such decisions can have 
immense impact on current and subsequent patients, the public health response, and success of 
future clinical trials. We highlight these dilemmas and underscore the need to proactively set up 
procedures that allow early and ethical deployment of MCMs as part of clinical trials. When 
clinical trials remain difficult to deploy, we present several suggestions of how compassionate use 
of off-label and unlicensed MCMs can be made more informed and ethical. We highlight several 
collaborations seeking to address these gaps in data and procedures to inform future clinical and 
public health decision making.
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Ethics
SIR WILLIAM OSLER once commented that ‘‘medicine is a science of uncertainty and an art of 
probability.’’1 In the realm of medical uncertainty, the care of patients with uncommon but 
emerging and high-impact infectious diseases occupies a unique place. Treatment is often 
hampered by limited understanding of the pathogen and little objective data on clinical 
progression and optimal supportive care. The few therapeutic candidates that exist frequently 
have limited efficacy data in humans. Outbreaks of such diseases are occurring with greater 
frequency because of increasing population and migration, trade and travel, and 
environmental factors, creating an urgent need for ways to efficiently develop, compare, and 
prioritize targeted medical countermeasures ( MCMs).2
The diseases under consideration here are those that occur relatively rarely but have the 
potential for easy transmissibility in a population (including to healthcare workers and 
researchers) and high mortality (eg, the hemorrhagic fevers, emerging respiratory 
pathogens). Several factors serve as hindrances to the development and testing of MCMs for 
such pathogens. First, outbreaks occur sporadically and frequently in resource-poor areas 
with limited infrastructure for either translational research or advanced clinical care. Second, 
these potentially highly transmissible pathogens require formative research to be conducted 
in biosafety level-4 (BSL-4) labs, which are few in number and exist mostly in resource-rich 
countries.3,4 Finally, the sporadic nature of market demand and the low resources of the 
populations at risk translates to inconsistent public and commercial interest in financing the 
development of MCMs.5 The conventional ‘‘gold standard’’ for rigorous safety and efficacy 
testing of MCMs is the randomized controlled trial, and licensure from the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) is typically given based on evidence from randomized 
controlled trials. Such trials are lengthy and expensive. Public interest and political will to 
fund development of MCMs for diseases of interest may be high during an outbreak but 
wane once the outbreak has ended.6
Therefore, during an outbreak, clinicians and health authorities often find themselves 
learning about the manifestations, pathophysiology, outcomes, and sequelae of these 
infections at the same time that they are trying to make sensible clinical and policy decisions 
regarding appropriate MCMs. With few or no licensed therapies with good efficacy data 
available, clinical providers considering investigational MCMs must interpret presumed 
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safety and efficacy from preclinical studies that may or may not translate well to humans. 
The evaluation of the evidence and prioritizing options, in some situations, may be led by 
the individual clinician or organization that is actively treating patients, leading to a request 
to the appropriate regulatory authority to authorize the use of specific investigational MCMs, 
rather than a more typical scenario in which the regulatory agency chooses which MCMs to 
authorize based on previously available data. In such conditions, the use of the MCM is 
frequently authorized under a compassionate use protocol, without strict requirements for 
standardized practices or data collection. Decisions on which MCMs to use, and how, may 
thus vary widely between clinicians and institutions, contributing to inconsistent 
interpretation of outcomes.
Here we highlight the clinical and ethical challenges associated with evaluating experimental 
treatments for emerging infectious diseases of major public health concern under conditions 
of unpredictable clinical need, limited pre-existing data, and poor infrastructure for clinical 
research. We also underscore the importance of ongoing proactive investments and efforts to 
push MCM development from the preclinical stage to human testing in randomized 
controlled trials so as to reduce future need for the compassionate use mechanism. We 
outline several approaches that could facilitate the prompt initiation of rigorous drug trials 
when an outbreak appears. If it is not feasible to develop rigorous randomized controlled 
trials for certain MCMs, we recommend that more organized and stringent preclinical and 
operational approaches be developed to evaluate the potential benefits and hazards of 
experimental MCMs planned for compassionate use. Underpinning all of these 
recommendations is a call for ethical and operational guidelines on how MCMs in various 
stages of development should be evaluated, existing data gathered and analyzed, prospective 
data collected, and further research prioritized. Lastly, we share examples of organizations 
and collaborations attempting to address the issues above and present some insights about 
procedures that could be recommended in the absence of guidelines.
A NEED FOR GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The 2013–2016 Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in West Africa provides a poignant 
illustration of the central dilemmas presented above. Numerous investigational MCMs were 
given under emergency use authorization in West Africa, the United States, and Europe 
during the 2013–2016 epidemic. Without any FDA-approved targeted MCMs, and in the 
setting of a growing public health crisis, there were renewed international calls for 
investment in the development of novel therapies and increased availability of experimental 
treatments in the field. A World Health Organization (WHO) panel concluded that there was 
an ‘‘ethical imperative’’ to make therapies with promising preclinical data available to 
patients with EVD.7 Many experts and much of the lay public felt that patients with EVD 
had a right to experimental treatments because of the high mortality of the disease and at 
least some reasonable expectation of benefit.8,9 Conversely, others in the scientific 
community argued that insufficient data existed to guarantee benefit from any of the MCMs 
being considered, and that there was even potential for harm.10 Significant international 
discussion also ensued during that epidemic about whether a traditional randomized 
controlled trial was ethical in an outbreak setting.
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The experience from this epidemic showed that, although responding to public calls for 
access in the absence of rigorous trials, both the off-label use of licensed products and the 
compassionate use of unlicensed products had undetermined benefit and possible harm for 
patients and provided little additional, generalizable scientific knowledge. This is because, 
first and foremost, the emergency use of off-label or experimental MCMs blurs the line 
between research and clinical care—that is, purposes that can have fundamentally different 
outcomes. Largent argued that ‘‘whereas medical care focuses on providing optimal care to 
individual patients, clinical research is primarily concerned with producing knowledge for 
the benefit of future patients.’’11(p502) And yet, due to the sporadic presentation of EVD 
cases, the WHO panel recommended that data should be gathered for scientific inquiry 
during emergency use of investigational therapeutics where possible, as long as their use was 
equitable and there was monitoring for adverse effects.7
The use of an approved therapeutic for an off-label indication is not covered by the same 
regulatory agencies as is the use of experimental agents available through compassionate 
use, but both approaches can easily result in a situation of essentially unregulated research. 
Neither offer the stringent human subject protections, clinical equipoise, and research 
oversight generally applied to formal clinical trials.
In the case of off-label use in the United States, clinicians are allowed to use their judgment 
in offering any licensed drug or other MCM for an indication for which it has not been FDA 
approved (off-label use). The FDA advises physicians to use scientific rationale and medical 
evidence to guide such use. When US physicians fail to do this, their conduct and its 
consequences fall under the jurisdiction of state medical licensing boards. Adverse outcomes 
also raise the threat of malpractice actions by patients or patients’ families unhappy with 
those outcomes.11
But what about in the middle of an outbreak in a resource-limited setting? The West African 
EVD epidemic highlighted this dilemma, when certain Ebola treatment units repurposed 
available drugs approved for other indications for off-label use in EVD patients.12,13 In one 
case, approximately 100 consecutive patients were given atorvastatin and irbesartan as a 
targeted MCM against Ebola under the compassionate use mechanism. Results were 
reported without formal documentation of the standard of care received by those patients or 
of their mortality outcomes.14 Such informal implementation and reporting of an 
experimental off-label use of an approved drug highlights the challenges of ensuring that 
product use in resource-limited settings meets the rigorous reporting requirements for such 
use expected in a developed setting. Richardson et al report a wide disparity among the 
studies eventually published on the West Africa EVD epidemic and ambiguity as to whether 
internationally recognized ethical criteria were met.13
In the case of compassionate use of a nonapproved agent, who should make the decision of 
how much data are sufficient to allow use in humans? In non-outbreak settings, there is 
generally a joint decision-making process between FDA regulators and treating physicians 
and institutions, as has occurred for many laboratory-acquired infections and exposures to 
emerging pathogens.15 In resource-limited settings and during an outbreak, the decision to 
import an unapproved MCM falls to the regulatory agencies of national governments. The 
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process may be initiated by specific requests from clinicians or organizations, or it may be 
led by an international agency such as the WHO, which developed the MEURI process 
(Monitored Emergency Use of Unregistered and Investigational Interventions) for the 
current epidemic in the North Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
The WHO convened experts to recommend specific MCMs and facilitated the national 
authority’s ability to provide certain agents to treatment units.16 The eventual use in an 
individual patient is still often determined by treating clinicians or their specific 
organization.
In all of these settings, MCMs are often administered in drastically different clinical settings 
with different standards of care, as was the case in the West African epidemic, and 
sometimes by care providers with minimal prior experience in providing EVD-related care, 
making any data largely ungeneralizable.17,18 Even when background standard of care was 
more or less equivalent, such as for most of the 27 EVD patients cared for in the United 
States and Europe during 2014–15, use of investigational therapeutics without comparative 
protocols or controls made it difficult to determine the relative benefits or harm from the 
products.3,19,20
Lastly, in resource-limited settings, nonstandardized investigational use can cause further 
harm if it ‘‘consumes scarce healthcare resources’’ for the current patient or diverts public 
health funds for future patients with uncertain evidence of benefit.11 The small samples sizes 
could also obscure potential harm that may not become evident until a drug is used in much 
larger populations under more standardized conditions.
Eventually, several experimental therapies were deployed for testing in the West Africa 
outbreak in either traditional randomized designs or with modified study structures that 
included use of 2 different therapeutics in different study arms rather than placebo. However, 
by the time formal protocols were put in place, the epidemic had begun to recede, leaving 
trials under-enrolled and under-powered. The yield of scientific knowledge on 
investigational countermeasures backed by robust data was distressingly thin.21 In addition, 
in many situations, the initiation of therapeutic protocols in an Ebola treatment unit was 
accompanied by enhancement of laboratory diagnostic capacity, increased available 
personnel, and more consistent provision of nonspecific supportive care. Hence, improved 
outcomes may have resulted from improvement in the baseline standard of care under 
research conditions, rather than from a specific therapeutic agent. More disconcerting, 
apparently equivocal results may have masked what could have been a deleterious effect of 
the agent.22,23 This scenario highlights the benefit of a placebo arm with the highest level of 
supportive care, despite some of the ethical arguments against it.
In the aftermath of the epidemic, many subject matter experts argued that to generate 
actionable evidence of effectiveness on new MCMs, their deployment must occur in a trial 
setting with a clear scientific question and with human subject protections inherent in this 
type of research.17,21 What steps can be proactively taken to ensure that MCMs are ready for 
trial when an outbreak occurs?
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BEYOND COMPASSIONATE USE
As with many emerging infectious diseases, although we may not know where the next 
Ebola or Marburg disease outbreak will occur, we can say with near certainty that future 
outbreaks will occur. The recent experiences with EVD epidemics illustrate that we cannot 
get definitive efficacy data without randomized controlled trials. Implementing such trials 
with the speed necessary to capture data in an outbreak can occur only if prioritization and 
protocols are in place before it begins.17 Consistent funding streams through international 
and government agencies to support of this type of research has previously been identified as 
a critical component of readiness and is not discussed at length here.24,25
Several scientific and organizational steps could improve preparedness of the international 
community to successfully conduct clinical research in an outbreak:
• Setting international research and public health priorities for diseases in 
need of further clinical research: In advance of drug development, the 
international community can identify those (re)emerging infectious diseases that 
constitute priorities for further clinical research. The WHO R&D blueprint 
helped pave the path toward this goal.26 WHO employed a multi-step approach 
that included the development of a methodology to identify a list of priority 
diseases, the introduction of an annual review of the list, and the development of 
a decision-making guide on inclusion of novel diseases.27
• Advancing the preclinical agenda: When human cases are rare and 
experimental infection in humans for research purposes is not an acceptable 
option, animal models are the usual way to develop knowledge of how MCMs 
might perform in humans. Unfortunately, our current understanding of 
comparative safety and efficacy of different MCMs is greatly limited by an 
incomplete preclinical and animal testing database. Further, animal models do 
not always reflect typical routes of human exposure and infection or the history 
of disease in humans.28 In terms of comparing agents, most of the existing 
MCMs for EVD were developed independently and were rarely evaluated by 
identical methodologies or with the same set of experiments. Meanwhile, studies 
of combination therapy—one of the modern hallmarks in treating viral diseases
—is almost totally lacking with these countermeasures. It is virtually impossible 
to determine whether some combinations of these agents might display synergy, 
antagonism, or indifference among each other or with drugs used routinely in 
clinical care.
For these reasons, there is a compelling need for organizations to work collaboratively to 
support meaningful animal (particularly nonhuman primate) studies to address the identified 
knowledge gaps in advance of future outbreaks. Current animal models should be refined so 
that combination treatment strategies can be properly evaluated. Drug manufacturers should 
work closely with collaborating researchers hoping to bring an MCM to market to ensure 
that intellectual property rights are protected and that concerns about competition for a 
pathway to product licensure will not hamper such collaboration.
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• Prioritization of MCMs to be tested in an emergency: Transparent and 
collaborative discussions regarding which MCMs are available, have promise, 
and would be ideal for testing during the next inevitable outbreak are needed for 
optimal resource expenditures by governments and public health bodies. In 2014, 
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and the FDA 
gathered a group of researchers, clinicians, regulators, and other subject matter 
experts to develop a common strategy for clinical research on countermeasures 
for EVD over 2 separate workshops.17 The workshops allowed presentation of 
up-to-date evidence on countermeasures (published and unpublished) and a 
discussion of those that it would be clinically acceptable and logistically possible 
to test in the field. Through a consensus-building process, participants prioritized 
MCMs that showed promise and readiness for randomized controlled trial 
deployment. Additionally, the workshops created consensus for a ‘‘master 
protocol’’ with an adaptive format of clinical randomized controlled trials that 
integrated investigational therapies combined with an optimized standard of care 
versus the latter alone.
The methodology employed in these workshops was established through prior 
meetings among expert groups to determine the care and treatment of researchers 
exposed to filoviruses while working in BSL-4 laboratories.29 These examples 
can provide a model for how collaborative evaluations and prioritization of 
MCMs could be conducted.
• Implementing agreements between governments and public health 
authorities prior to an emergency: In the recent EVD outbreak in the North 
Kivu region of the DRC (August 2018), WHO’s proactive work to gain in-
country approval for investigational product compassionate use that began in the 
prior outbreak in the DRC’s Equateur Province proved useful.30 As a result, 
WHO was able to facilitate the availability of investigational MCMs (1 vaccine, 
4 therapeutics) under compassionate use with the MEURI protocol discussed 
above early in the outbreak while undertaking planning for a randomized 
controlled trial. The use of existing agreements with ministries of health and off-
the-shelf compassionate use protocols is a good model for the future. However, 
using such protocols alone may only provide anecdotal evidence of safety and 
efficacy, if not accompanied by more robust comparative clinical trials. The 
existence of this collaboration is now leading the way toward a randomized 
controlled trial of 3 investigational drugs sponsored by NIAID that will be not 
only multicenter but also span over multiple outbreaks, allowing for early trial 
initiation during the next outbreak.31
• Supporting local research capacity: The development of host country research 
capacity, including the fostering of national researchers and the establishment of 
diagnostic and research laboratories prior to the onset of an outbreak, is vital to 
the promotion and conduct of research in resource-limited countries.32,33 It 
would be reasonable to tailor such capacity-building efforts to the epidemiologic 
distribution of the diseases considered as high priority.
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• Improving and standardizing supportive clinical care: Finally, in order to 
ethically justify any randomized controlled trials with a placebo arm, clinicians 
and researchers need confidence that they are providing the best supportive care 
possible in all study arms, including the placebo arm. In the case of filoviruses, 
for which most care has been given in highly constrained and under-resourced 
settings, many questions remain about optimal nonspecific supportive 
management of patients with EVD.34,35 However, it is likely that the increased 
survival rate of infected responders who were evacuated to highly resourced care 
facilities was in part due to intensive supportive care.3 By improving the delivery 
of supportive care (and researching what constitutes best supportive care for 
specific diseases), we may also reduce mortality and hence make the allure of 
untested products less compelling for physicians and patients during these 
outbreaks.36 Additionally, it is ethically important that we strive to close the gap 
in capacity for intensive supportive care between resource-rich and -limited 
settings. This is particularly important for those pathogens that pose a significant 
risk to healthcare workers. The provision of high-quality supportive care is often 
deferred during the initial phase of an outbreak while awaiting establishment of 
safe facilities and personal protection protocols.37 However, building research 
capacity in resource-limited countries may aid in timely allotment of high-
quality of care. Because conducting clinical research typically requires some 
degree of laboratory support and a reliable standard of available clinical care, 
including research as a part of the clinical care enterprise complements both 
activities: Treatment facilities that provide excellent baseline care are necessary 
for the conduct of clinical research in an outbreak, and laboratories put in place 
for research can also provide clinically useful data in real time to support the care 
of ill patients.
DECISION MAKING WHEN EVIDENCE IS LIMITED
Despite efforts to further an organized research agenda that can yield data with scientific 
rigor, there will likely still be situations in responding to outbreaks where well-meaning 
clinicians will need to consider the use of experimental MCMs under compassionate use. 
What recommendations should clinicians follow for choosing among potential MCMs, how 
can they collect clinical data in a way that will contribute meaningfully to the knowledge 
base, and when should experimental therapies be re-prioritized or abandoned?
• Deciding between MCMs in development: The development of summaries of 
potential countermeasures would be useful in assisting clinicians to make 
expeditious decisions on which products might best benefit their patients. WHO 
posted such a summary on their website during the 2013–2016 West Africa 
outbreak.38 The National Ebola Training and Education Center (NETEC) is a 
consortium of 3 medical facilities (University of Nebraska Medical Center, 
Emory University Hospital, and New York Bellevue Hospital) that cared for 
EVD patients during the 2013–2016 outbreak.39 NETEC has established a 
Special Pathogens Research Network (SPRN) among 10 regional biocontainment 
units in strategic locations across the country. An MCM working group within 
Bhadelia et al. Page 8
Health Secur. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2020 February 06.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
SPRN is working proactively to develop similar summaries on diseases with the 
potential to cause outbreaks and that lack licensed countermeasures, with the 
goal of posting the summaries for care providers within and outside the SPRN to 
access. The reviews prioritize promising MCM and other treatment options in 
more advanced stages, but document options at all points in the pipeline, and are 
updated regularly as evidence and guidance change.
The group has prioritized the following pathogens for initial summaries: Marburg 
virus, MERS virus, Lassa virus, Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) 
virus, Nipah virus, and smallpox/monkeypox viruses, based on epidemic 
potential, lack of licensed countermeasures, and recurrences in local or regional 
outbreaks. An updated tabular summary for Ebola virus is also being developed. 
Such efforts need to be updated with regular frequency and developed 
collaboratively with researchers, clinicians, and public health representatives. As 
the literature relevant to some of these diseases continues to evolve at a rapid 
pace, maintaining up-to-date summaries will be a challenge. To be immediately 
useful, the results of these efforts need to be made accessible for clinicians in 
both resource-rich and resource-limited settings.
• Assessing appropriate quantity and quality of data for clinical use: The FDA 
has provided the animal rule pathway to licensure for products for which human 
randomized controlled trials may not be feasible. However, there is not clear 
consensus on how to assess data from animal models or limited observational 
data from human cases.40 What level of evidence (ie, in vitro, small animal, 
nonhuman primate, or human) is ‘‘enough’’ to arrive at valid conclusions, and 
how much data are sufficient to allow for more than just limited compassionate 
use in an outbreak setting? Ideally, a standardized data collection set could be 
developed, after input from regulators and subject matter experts, for use by all 
clinicians using experimental MCMs to allow for aggregation of data collected 
from individual cases.
• Developing guidelines for ethical use of investigational therapeutics and the 
ability to perform a rapid ethical analysis during emerging infectious 
disease outbreaks: The summaries of evidence on potential MCMs for different 
diseases (as discussed above) can help fulfill part of the data gap. However, 
accessible guidelines also need to be developed around the ethics of 
compassionate use in outbreaks, including the possible benefits and the risks of 
unanticipated harm. In many circumstances, the compassionate use of MCMs in 
emergencies can be an ethical grey area, owing at least in part to variations in 
ethical norms across the response. A real-time ethical analysis with stakeholders, 
including clinicians, researchers, and members of the affected population or 
community, and public health practitioners may be a supporting approach to 
assessing evidence and implementing new guidelines. An independent, culturally 
contextualized ethics consultation may provide a beneficial reality check 
regarding appropriate assessment of MCM data and, in turn, clinical use. 
Community sensitization of known MCMs ahead of an outbreak with the support 
of local public health and healthcare practitioners can foster the ability to rapidly 
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deploy MCMs in the event of developing knowledge during an outbreak and help 
integrate local interpretations of ethical issues.
• Interval evaluation to determine whether clinical equipoise can still be 
maintained on experimental MCMs: Equally important to avoiding harm from 
treatments that may lack benefits is determining when a treatment has developed 
enough evidence to be considered ‘‘standard of care,’’ even when not yet 
licensed and especially if there remain no licensed alternatives. Davey et al 
outlined an evaluation process for ZMapp during and after the PREVAIL II 
study.17 The positive, but not quite statistically significant, results from that trial, 
in combination with the highly publicized use of the drug for medically 
evacuated healthcare workers, suggested for most, but not all, subject matter 
experts that equipoise had shifted toward the positioning of ZMapp for future 
studies.17 As may happen with future MCMs, the data evaluated were obtained 
from a combination of individual compassionate use cases and from standardized 
trial conditions. Such an evaluative process is more complicated than interpreting 
data in the setting of a well-powered trial, where a data safety and monitoring 
board is in place and interim review could provide valuable insight. 
Disagreement regarding whether agnosticism about the effectiveness of a drug in 
a study can be maintained also limits buy-in from response organizations and 
partner countries where trials may be held. The guidelines discussed in the 
section above could more clearly address the level of evidence sufficient in an 
outbreak setting to ethically justify continued use of the MCM in question if data 
are not supportive or, if data are supportive, to continue other studies where the 
promising drug is not included in the standard of care arm. A similar quandary 
may also arise when an experimental vaccine becomes integral to the public 
health response, as has occurred with the recombinant vesicular stomatitis 
vaccine (rVSV) for Zaire ebolavirus in the 2 latest DRC outbreaks in 2018. 
Based on the successful model employed during the West Africa outbreak, the 
vaccine has been used both as pre-exposure immunization in healthcare workers 
and as postexposure prophylaxis of Ebola contacts and healthcare workers.41–44 
This wide-spread use of the vaccine has implications for testing of other potential 
immunotherapy-based MCMs for the same indications.
CONCLUSION
The size, scope, and duration of the 2013–2016 West Africa EVD epidemic, combined with 
the high case fatality proportions and the availability of promising MCMs, led to an 
opportunity to test those countermeasures in humans and a call to implement the operational 
use of those countermeasures earlier than in the past. This phenomenon established a new 
international paradigm for use of experimental therapeutics during an outbreak. Subsequent 
outbreaks of Ebola and Marburg virus disease have continued along this new model. Other 
outbreaks of severe diseases that lack licensed countermeasures may follow similar patterns. 
Given the likelihood of future outbreaks, the continual evolution of our understanding of the 
diseases themselves, and the development of promising therapeutic candidates in 
development, the medical community can embrace the opportunity to step back and consider 
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how best to simultaneously advance knowledge and patient care when these opportunities 
arise. We have attempted to provide a summary of some key aspects of the challenges being 
faced and have issued a call to action for the international medical community to work out 
the processes to apply the new knowledge and determine the best methodologies in advance 
of the next outbreak.
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